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I

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the
statesman and the commander have to make is [to] establish . . . the
kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor
trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the
first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.1
—Carl von Clausewitz

n the spring of 1763 Great Britain, basking in the warm afterglow of decisive
victory in the Seven Years War, presided over a vast and unprecedented
global empire. The small island nation seemingly, and rather suddenly, found
itself without peer—enjoying a level of military and political hegemony not
seen since the days of the Roman Empire.2 It was a unique, albeit fleeting,
position. In the span of a mere twenty years, the world’s preeminent global
power, despite enjoying a considerable advantage in almost every conceivable category used to calculate military potential, found itself disgraced and
defeated by a start-up nation possessing a markedly inferior conventional military capability. Crippled by a grossly burgeoning national debt, diplomatically
isolated, and politically divided at home, the North Ministry became embroiled
in a protracted and unpopular global war that its policymakers and military
leaders seemed incapable of understanding—much less winning—until it was
far too late.3
The War for American Independence, especially if viewed from the
British perspective, retains extraordinary significance for contemporary practitioners of national and military strategy. The conflict contains many valuable
and exceedingly relevant insights regarding the rise, prevention, and challenges of insurgency, the perils of a people’s war for a foreign power, and the
Lieutenant Colonel Canfield is an infantry officer. He holds an MA in history
from North Carolina State University, and advanced degrees from the Marine Corps
Command and Staff College, the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting, and
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absolute imperative of a thoughtful, coherent, and proactive national strategy
that integrates all instruments of national power prior to, not just after, the
commencement of hostilities. The British experience also provides timeless
lessons regarding the difficulties of balancing ambitious political ends with
limited military means, civil-military relations, and sustaining national will in
democratic societies during protracted and unpopular wars. Finally, the conflict
serves as a conspicuous example of the potential for irregular warfare to thwart
the application of conventionally superior military force and thereby decide or
influence the political outcomes of wars and campaigns. In that regard, Great
Britain’s experience in the War for American Independence provides an important prologue for many of the contemporary challenges associated with the
application of coercive force in a postcolonial and postnuclear world. While
predicting the future remains problematic, the United States should, in all likelihood, expect both the character and conduct of its future wars to more closely
resemble that of the American revolution, albeit from the British perspective,
than those of a bygone era where industrialized nation-states waged near-total
wars of annihilation.4
This article uses an abbreviated examination of the Southern Campaign
(1780-82) to explore the principal causes of British strategic failure in the War
for American Independence. The subject demands more attention than it traditionally receives, especially from the nation that has, in the span of a mere
two generations, overtaken and largely assumed Great Britain’s once dominant role on the world stage. America’s ascendancy, however, has not come
without cost. Ironically, several of the major political, economic, and military
challenges confronting the United States today bear a remarkable similarity to
those that plagued her one-time colonial master.5 Chief among them is perhaps
the most daunting and perplexing military issue of our time—how to translate
supremacy on the conventional battlefield into enduring political success in an
age of austerity and limited war.
In a conflict full of dubious assumptions and missed opportunities,
the pinnacle of British political and strategic miscalculation occurred in the
South.6 Though overshadowed by the dramatic events at Yorktown, the consistent and simultaneous application of both regular and irregular warfare
during the Southern Campaign proved decisive. It, more than anything else,
broke the political will of the loyalists in the region, helped wrest control of
the Southern Colonies away from the British, and contributed, in no small
way, to Britain’s eventual decision to abandon the war altogether. Ironically,
the campaign produced no singularly decisive battle. Nor did it conform to the
“traditional” view of limited dynastic warfare.7 Instead, American success was
slowly sequestered, not seized, by Major General Nathanael Greene’s astute
integration of conventional and unconventional forces in pursuit of a definitive political, not military, victory. The British, of course, made many crucial
errors. Whether the Americans won the Southern Campaign or the British lost
it remains an intriguing historical question significantly beyond the scope of
this article. Greene, and his fellow patriots, however, realized what a host of
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British commanders and their political masters in Whitehall could not—the
war in the south, like the Revolution itself, was a complex, unconventional,
and violent political struggle for the loyalty and allegiance of the American
population writ large. It could not, and would not, be decided by the application
of conventional military force alone.8

The Devolution of British Strategy
In December of 1774, a presumptuous King George III boldly asserted,
“The New England governments are in a State of Rebellion. Blows must decide
whether they are to be subject to this country or independent.”9 With the clairvoyance of hindsight, however, the British decision to employ force in the
spring of 1775 rested on two fundamental miscalculations. First, the authorities
in London, both civilian and military, underestimated the fighting qualities
and irregular capabilities of the American militia.10 Second, most, if not all, of
these same men, severely misjudged the extent and veracity of popular support
the patriot cause enjoyed, not just in New England, but throughout the thirteen
colonies.11 Fiscal and political constraints in London demanded a quick and
efficient termination of the conflict in America. An emphasis on the former,
however, precluded a realistic and prescient understanding of the latter. The
result was an overly sanguine view of the actual political situation in the colonies and the adoption of a British military strategy that, though it considered the
alternative of a naval war, remained wedded to the promise of decisive battle
until the twin disasters of Saratoga and the subsequent signing of the FrancoAmerican alliance in February 1778 forced a dramatic reordering of priorities.12
The Americans, too, initially miscalculated. The wave of revolutionary
enthusiasm that crested with the British evacuation of Boston and signing of
the Declaration of Independence gave way to the harsh reality of Washington’s
near destruction at New York and the stark realization that “native courage”
and revolutionary zeal alone could not secure independence.13 Unlike his British
counterparts, however, Washington demonstrated considerable pragmatism in
the face of necessity.14 Although he longed for a “conventional” victory against
British regulars, by September 1776 Washington curtailed his initial strategic
designs in favor of a Fabian approach focused on the enduring political, not
military, objective: “We should on all occasions avoid a general action, and put
nothing to risk unless compelled by a necessity, into which we ought never to
be drawn.” 15
The British never fully reconciled their faith in decisive battle with the
fact that Washington, after barely escaping from New York in the fall of 1776,
had no intention of giving it. Deeply flawed strategic assumptions combined
with chance, the tyranny of distance in the age of sail, and episodes of tactical blundering precluded the destruction of Washington’s fledgling continental
army and led to the unconscionable surrender of General John Burgoyne’s
entire command at Saratoga in the fall of 1777.16 Worse, France’s formal entry
into the war in March 1778 transformed the suppression of an internal rebellion
into a global conflict.17 Suddenly, Great Britain, for the first time in 150 years,
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found herself without the aid or support of a single European ally while engaged
in a dangerous and rapidly escalating war with her ancient Bourbon rivals.18
Operations in America, particularly for the Admiralty, became secondary to
defense of the British Isles and larger economic interests in the Caribbean.
Accordingly, in the spring of 1778, the North Ministry assumed a defensive posture in America.19 Diplomatically isolated and forced to react to the
imminent threat of French sea power, the government recalled its Commanderin-Chief in America, Major General William Howe, ordered the evacuation of
Philadelphia, and grudgingly dispatched the Earl of Carlisle on a desperate, and
poorly timed, attempt to secure peace with honor in the colonies.20
By the close of 1779, however, it became increasingly clear that Great
Britain, despite an enormous expenditure of blood and treasure, was losing
the war.21 The revolutionaries maintained tenuous, but effective, control over
the vast majority of the colonial population. British forces, by contrast, found
themselves confined to the coastal enclaves of New York, Long Island, and
Savannah, under the constant and very real threat of a menacing French fleet.
More importantly, four years of military paralysis, France’s entry into the war,
and a steadily deteriorating strategic situation emboldened a vocal and increasingly effective political opposition in the House of Commons.22 The 1778 naval
crisis followed by Admiral Keppel’s court martial, the failure of the Carlisle
Peace Commission, and the raucous parliamentary inquiry into Sir William
Howe’s generalship produced a series of inimical public debates that exposed a
pattern of ministerial blundering and an ominous break down in civil-military
relations.23 The events cast a long shadow on the government’s planning and
conduct of the war and unleashed a torrent of political blame and recrimination
that very nearly toppled the North Ministry.24
The government’s tenuous and slowly eroding support in Parliament
forced a tacit reversal of military policy. Only by insisting that the war for
America could still be won, not with an endless and expensive supply of
reinforcements buttressing a failed strategy, but rather by harnessing dormant
loyalist strength to champion a new one, could the Ministry maintain the requisite political support to continue the war.25 The idea exploited long-standing,
though increasingly questionable, assumptions about loyalist strength in the
south and conveniently nested with the government’s plans to shift the seat of
the war to the Caribbean.26 In December of 1779, Howe’s successor, Lieutenant
General Henry Clinton embarked the majority of his army in New York harbor
and sailed for Charleston, long viewed as the key to political control of the southern colonies and an important port for future operations in the West Indies. The
seizure of Charleston, intended to relieve pressure on loyalist forces operating
in Georgia, also constituted the initial phase of a larger “southern strategy”
designed to ignite a counterrevolution in the Carolinas by reestablishing royal
government and recruiting loyalist militia, supported by a small number of
British regulars, to defend it.27 In many ways, the belated adaptation of a “pacification” strategy, conceived in the caldron of wartime domestic politics vice
the crucible of deliberate military design, represented Britain’s last best hope.28
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Unfortunately for the British cause, it was bungled in execution by an increasingly dysfunctional Ministry that continued to see and hear what conformed to
its concerted view and a bold and audacious commander who stubbornly clung
to the chimera of decisive battle until it was far too late.29

The Seizure of Charleston
On 1 February 1780, a powerful expeditionary force under the
command of Sir Henry Clinton landed on Simmons Island, thirty miles south of
Charleston. By late March, Clinton, with approximately 12,000 troops, crossed
the Ashley River and laid siege to the beleaguered city. Isolated and cut off,
Major General Benjamin Lincoln reluctantly surrendered the city and its 5,500
defenders on 12 May. The disaster at Charleston, by far the greatest calamity to
befall any American army during the war, emboldened the loyalists and nearly
broke the back of the patriot cause in South Carolina. Clinton moved quickly
to restore British authority. He organized provincial militia units and initially
implemented a liberal pacification policy, whereby the majority of former patriots were paroled and allowed to return to their homes.30
By late May, however, Clinton and his naval counterpart, Admiral
Mariot Arbuthnot, became increasingly concerned over reports of a French
fleet headed for North America. As they hastily re-embarked for New York to
counter the threat, the British Commander-in-Chief, still exultant in the wake
of his stunning success at Charleston, made a fateful decision. Realizing his
pending departure would dramatically reduce British troop strength in the
Carolinas and that the benevolence of the crown’s original parole policies precluded the recruitment of enough locally raised provincial militia to make up
the difference, Clinton suddenly reversed himself. On 3 June, he issued a new
proclamation forcing paroled former patriots to swear an oath of allegiance to
the King and, more importantly, to actively engage in supporting royal authority. The decision, born out of practical military necessity, constituted a grievous
political miscalculation.31 While it was reasonable to expect a former Whig to
give up the fight and return home, it was quite another matter to now force him
to take up arms against his friends and neighbors.

Victory Was Never Enough
Cornwallis assumed command of the Southern Army on 5 June. He
wasted little time implementing Clinton’s new policy and expanding British
control over the region. With his seaboard bases at Savannah, Beaufort,
Charleston, and Georgetown now secure, Cornwallis aggressively projected
British expeditionary power deep into the country’s interior. He established a
series of garrisons along the Saluda River westward to Ninety-Six and pursued
the scattered remnants of the Continental army north along the Catawba River
valley. On 16 August, Cornwallis, with just 2,200 troops, shattered General
Horatio Gates at Camden and sent what remained of the demoralized American
army scurrying across the North Carolina border toward Charlotte. Ironically,
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though no organized Continental force remained in the Carolinas, the seeds of
political disaster, long ignored or completely misunderstood, now sprouted in
the wake of Cornwallis’s conventional success.32
Cornwallis’s army, even with the addition of a substantial number of
loyalist militia, was simply too small to consolidate British authority over so
large an area. Moreover, the combination of imperial hubris and the flawed
implementation of Clinton’s pacification policies ignited an insurgency that
quickly metastasized into a ruthless and bloody civil war.33 American guerrillas led by Thomas Sumter, Francis Marion, and Andrew Pickens attacked
British outposts and threatened lines of communications.34 More significantly,
while Cornwallis and his loyalist militia searched in vain for the remnants of
Gates’ scattered Continentals far to the north, American partisans killed or
intimidated large numbers of Tories, who suddenly found themselves outnumbered and unprotected.35
On 7 October, a motley collection of rugged American mountain men
destroyed one of Cornwallis’s flanking columns, under the command of Major
Patrick Ferguson at King’s Mountain. The Scotch-Irish Presbyterians of the
Watauga region established a semiautonomous community in the mountains of
western North Carolina after the Battle of Alamance in 1771.36 They harbored
no particular loyalty to either crown or the fledgling United States, but watched
with increasing trepidation as Ferguson’s column, comprised entirely of loyalist militia, approached their homes. When the aggressive and head-strong
British Major threatened to “burn the whole country” if the frontiersmen did
not turn over the Patriot Colonel Isaac Shelby, known to be taking refuge in the
area, over a thousand backwoods riflemen emerged seemingly out of nowhere
and quickly overwhelmed the column.37 The British lost 1,125 men in the hourlong battle, including at least nine prominent Tories who were hastily tried and
summarily executed. King’s Mountain marked a significant turning point in the
war. The shocking reversal all but destroyed the loyalist movement in the region
and forced a stunned Cornwallis, then on the outskirts of Charlotte, to beat a
hasty retreat south into the Palmetto State.38

The Road to Guilford Courthouse
Nathanael Greene arrived in Charlotte on 2 December 1780. The
former Quaker turned patriot inherited less than fifteen hundred disorganized
and dispirited men.39 Upon his selection to replace Gates as the commander of
the Southern Department, Greene undertook a detailed study of the topography
and terrain of the region. He harbored no illusions, however, about the dismal
prospects of defeating Cornwallis in a conventional military campaign. As such,
Greene proposed “to equip a flying army of about eight hundred horse and one
thousand infantry . . . and make a kind of partisan war.”40 On 4 December, he
established communications with Francis Marion and other partisan leaders.
Greene encouraged cooperation and implored patriot irregulars to provide
intelligence and continue their subversive operations while he made plans and
preparations to regain the initiative.41
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In late December, Greene moved south and boldly divided his army in
the face of Cornwallis’s superior force. On 17 January, Greene’s western detachment, commanded by Daniel Morgan, baited Lieutenant Colonel Banastre
Tarleton into giving battle at Cowpens.42 The subsequent destruction of a second
isolated British column in less than four months incensed Cornwallis, but did
little to alter his thinking regarding the utility of conventional military force in
a people’s war. As patriot militiamen simply melted back into the countryside,
the enraged British general initiated a precipitous and ill-advised pursuit of
Morgan that took him across the border and deep into western North Carolina.
Greene hastened north and consolidated his ragtag army but refused to
give battle. On 26 January, a frustrated Cornwallis, now operating over extended
lines of communications and unable to catch the fleet-footed Americans, decided
to burn his army’s baggage.43 The move did little to improve his mobility relative to the Americans. Greene continued a cat-and-mouse game of provocation
luring the British further north, while his partisans and militia continued to
harass British foraging parties and communications. On 15 March, Greene, his
ranks temporarily buoyed by an influx of militia, finally gave battle at Guilford
Court House. The British held the field, but it was a classic pyrrhic victory. Over
a quarter of Cornwallis’s army lay dead or wounded.44 Running dangerously
low on supplies and realizing that another “victory” over Greene would destroy
his emaciated army, Cornwallis left seventy of his most seriously wounded in
a Quaker meeting house at New Garden, reluctantly turned his back on the
Piedmont, and marched to the sea.45
The paucity of loyalist support, not logistical difficulties, proved decisive in Cornwallis’s fateful decision to abandon the Carolinas. Throughout the
campaign, Cornwallis stubbornly clung to the belief that a decisive tactical
victory over Greene would liberate or somehow empower the crown’s many
loyalist friends to join him. Guilford Court House finally shattered his naiveté.
Reflecting on the indecisive nature of the campaign, a frustrated Cornwallis
observed, “Many rode into camp, shook me by the hand, said they were glad
to see us, and that we had beat Greene, then rode home again. I could not get a
hundred men in all the Regulator’s country to stay with us even as militia.” 46
Cornwallis’s army limped into Wilmington on 7 April. Three days
later, the dejected general wrote to Clinton in New York, “I cannot help but
expressing my wishes that the Chesapeake may become the seat of the war.” 47
Amazingly, even at this late hour, Cornwallis still thought “a successful battle
may give us America.” 48 Greene, however, did not wait idle as the British contemplated shifting operations to Virginia. By 29 March, he decided to “carry
the war immediately into South Carolina.” 49 As Cornwallis moved north toward
his rendezvous with destiny, Greene and his American partisans returned to the
very seat of British power in the South. Unlike Cornwallis, however, Greene’s
objectives were political not military. Though he continued to lose battles,
Hobkirk’s Hill on 25 April and Eutaw Springs on 8 September, he nonetheless succeeded in further eroding British authority and political support among
the people of South Carolina. One by one, isolated British outposts scattered
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throughout the interior fell to Greene and his partisans. By October, the tide of
British expeditionary power that had once stretched to the mountains of western
North Carolina receded to the coastal bastions of Charleston and Savannah.50

Defeat by Indecision
When the unfathomable news of Yorktown reached London in
November 1781, the American Secretary, Lord George Germain, grasping
for the straws of an increasingly unlikely military victory, proposed raising
a force of 28,000 men to hold the coastal enclaves of New York, Charleston,
and Savanna.51 Similarly, in late December, the Governor of New York, James
Robertson, pleaded for reinforcements and the resumption of offensive warfare
in the north, arguing that “an army without hope of getting back America
should not stay in it.”52 Unfortunately for the North Ministry and the thousands
of loyalists in America it was the Governor’s tacit admission, not his call for
still more troops in support of an expensive and increasingly desultory war,
which more accurately reflected the political reality of a deeply divided Great
Britain.53 Germain, long buffeted by an angry sea of political recrimination,
finally resigned in early February. His replacement, Welbore Ellis, addressed a
skeptical Parliament on 22 February in a desperate attempt to rally the fragile
and rapidly eroding political support for the King’s policies. Remarkably,
the Ministry, rekindling the strategic debate after the Saratoga disaster, now
adopted a subtle variation of the opposition’s long-standing argument against
continuation of the war:
As to the American war, it had always been his firm opinion, that it
was just in its origin . . . but he never entertained an idea, nor did he
believe any man in that House ever imagined, that America was to be
reduced to obedience by force; his ideal always was that in America
we had many friends; and by strongly supporting them, we should
be able to destroy that party or faction that wished for war . . . . To
destroy that faction, and assist our friends there in that desired object,
was, in his opinion, the true and only object of the war. Whether that
object was now attainable, was the matter . . . to be considered.54

The opposition, vindicated by the Ministry’s tacit admission of failure
and galvanized by a rapid and unprecedented influx of political defections,
decided it was not attainable. On 27 February, the House of Commons
formally denounced “the further prosecution of offensive warfare on the
continent of North America, for the purpose of reducing the revolted colonies to obedience by force.”55 Less than a month later, the North Ministry
collapsed under the weight of a protracted, unpopular, and, in the minds of
most Englishmen, an ill-advised, poorly planned, and increasingly unwinnable war.56 On 27 March, the King, after briefly contemplating abdication,
begrudgingly turned to the opposition who formed a new government under
the leadership of the Marquis of Rockingham. The new Ministry quickly
abolished the American Department and ordered the evacuation of New
York, Charleston, and Savannah.57 In the process, the Rockingham Ministry
accomplished what Washington’s intrepid army, even after it was augmented
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by powerful French expeditionary forces and buoyed by the British disaster
at Yorktown, could never do—it physically removed the world’s dominant
military power from America.

War Turned Upside Down
Insurgencies represent complex political, social, and military problems.
They require an adroit, sophisticated, and flexible integration of all instruments
of national power to defeat or prevent. It would be wrong to pin the crown’s
failure in the South on Cornwallis alone, for the seeds of the British disaster
in America lay deep and were sown many years prior by men occupying more
influential positions.58 Yet, Cornwallis, like the vast majority of his British colleagues, fundamentally misunderstood both the nature and the character of
the war in the South. He embarked upon an ill-conceived and tragically flawed
campaign that focused, almost exclusively, on the physical destruction of an
enemy army. Moreover, Cornwallis’s tactical and operational plans, while bold
and audacious, were not in consonance with the spirit or intent of Clinton’s
instructions or the shift in British strategy made necessary by France’s entry
into the war.59 The Americans, by contrast, employed a decentralized strategy
that concentrated, not on the annihilation of British military forces, but rather
on securing the political and popular support of the indigenous population.60
Throughout the campaign the British consistently overestimated both
the extent and capabilities of loyalist support, failed to secure the local population, and seemed incapable of comprehending that the loyalty of the people
trumped the quest for tactical glories.61 The destruction of unsupported Tory
units at Ramsour’s Mill, North Carolina, and King’s Mountain, South Carolina,
in 1780 stifled the further recruitment of fence sitters and sent a chilling message
to would be loyalists. Though a significant percentage of the population were
indifferent or actually harbored pro-British sentiment, Cornwallis, by and large,
failed to secure it.62 Marauding Southern partisans prosecuted a shadowing, but
effective, campaign of fear and intimidation that eventually cemented the loyalties and allegiance of the local population.63 Ironically, Cornwallis facilitated
patriot political success by impetuously chasing Gates, and then Greene, into
the strategically insignificant terrain of the mountainous southern back country
and implementing flawed political-military policies that led to repressive acts of
violence against the civil population under British control.64
Greene and the Americans, by contrast, owed their success to the confluence of three principal factors. First, the terrain in the Carolinas, both human
and physical, facilitated patriot operations.65 The region’s ambiguous political
loyalties, restricted mobility, and challenging topography all leant themselves
to the type of isolated, hit and run, small-unit tactics employed by Greene and
his partisans. Second, Greene’s sophisticated comprehension of the relationship between military means and political ends precluded the destruction of
his undermanned army, fueled the insurgency, and ultimately consummated
his military endeavors with enduring political success. Lacking in tactical
acumen, he nonetheless proved patient and pragmatic only giving battle when
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the political or strategic gains clearly exceeded the tactical price. 66 Finally,
the tenacity and fighting qualities of the Southern partisan proved decisive.
The patriot cause inherited an exceptional cadre of experienced and committed
irregulars. Thomas Sumter, William Moultrie, Francis Marion, Issac Huger,
and Andrew Pickens organized and led small, but highly effective, partisan
units. These men, all veteran Indian fighters, possessed in-depth knowledge
of the local terrain and had long ago mastered the unconventional methods of
irregular warfare. For many, including both Sumter and Pickens, their visceral
hatred of the British cemented their loyalty to the patriot cause and ensured that
there would be no turning back.67
The war in the South was not won or lost on the conventional battlefield.
American success was the product of a complex, unconventional, and violent
political struggle for the loyalty and allegiance of the southern population.
American partisans, operating in countless towns and villages and employing
methods of political coercion that would appear unconscionable to us today,
proved decisive. While it seems unlikely that a man of Greene’s Quaker upbringing would have openly condoned these draconian tactics, many of which bear
a striking similarity to the abhorrent, but nonetheless, classic, insurgent tactics
used in Algeria, Vietnam, and Iraq, he most certainly knew they were being
employed. Not long after his arrival in the South he noted with a considerable
degree of resignation:
There is not a day passes but there are more or less who fall a sacrifice
to this savage disposition. The Whigs seem determined to extirpate
the Tories and the Tories the Whigs . . . . If a stop cannot be put to
these massacres, the country will be depopulated . . . as neither Whig
nor Tory can live.68

Operating over a century and a half prior to Mao, Greene and his
partisan colleagues mastered the quintessential elements of guerrilla warfare.
He possessed the presence of mind and clairvoyance of thought to employ a
hybrid combination of conventional and unconventional methods in pursuit of
a decisive political, not military, outcome. Greene realized, through a strange
combination of necessity and serendipity, what Cornwallis could not—the
Southern Revolution was a violent internal political struggle between the Tories
and Whigs of the Carolinas. It may be doubted today, with a considerable degree
of legitimacy, whether the British, burdened with the global responsibilities of
empire and shackled by the tyranny of distance in the age of sail, could have
ever prevailed in the face of such a complicated and unconventional undertaking.69 It appears certain, however, that the conflict in the South constituted
a type of warfare that Cornwallis and his political masters in London were
unprepared to confront and, most assuredly, failed to comprehend until it was
far too late.70

Conclusion: The Futility of Force and the Preservation of Power
Admittedly, the selective use of history is dangerous, but a careful
examination of the principal causes of British strategic failure in America offers
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a series of profound lessons for the exercise and preservation of US national
power in an age of austerity and limited war. First, an overreliance on tactical
prowess, manifested in the false hope of decisive battle, constitutes a poor substitute for a thoughtful, coherent, and proactive national strategy that integrates
all instruments of national power prior to, not just after, the commencement of
hostilities. Great Britain, not unlike the modern United States, was a seafaring
nation not a dominant land power. Endowed with the blessings of geography,
the United Kingdom traditionally exercised strategic patience combined with
sea power, economic leverage, and forward-thinking diplomacy to compensate
for the inherent limitations of its ground forces.71 All three of these enlightened
and far-sighted national policies failed or were never fully developed during the
War for American Independence.72
Once hostilities commenced, the British government consistently
struggled to achieve unity of effort across a compartmentalized and nonintegrated ministerial system. The fragmented nature of the imperial bureaucracy
eventually resulted in an increase in the power and influence of the American
Department. This did not, however, ensure cross-departmental integration or
the development of a prescient national strategy to deal with the problem of
rebellion.73 Britain’s senior military officer, Adjutant General Thomas Harvey
railed at the prospect of using the British Army to subdue America, “it is
impossible to conquer it with our British Army . . . . To attempt to conquer it
internally by our land force is as wild an idea as ever controverted common
sense.”74 Harvey was not alone. While most officials in the British government
agreed that force could be used, there was considerable divergence of opinion
on whether it should be.75 Similarly, many senior political and military leaders
advocated a maritime strategy based on economic pressure and British sea
power, believing the rebellion would eventually fall under its own weight.76
Such sage political-military advice, however, fell on deaf ears, hijacked,
in large measure, by the vocal remonstrations of several colonial governors
who fueled the false belief that the rebellion was the work of a vocal minority
of “turbulent and seditious” individual political agitators.77 Similarly, several
influential ministers advanced equally irresponsible myths of martial superiority. Sir Jeffery Amherst, for one, boasted that he could, with just 5,000 men,
sweep from one end of America to another. Likewise, Lord Sandwich of the
Admiralty declared that the Americans would run at “the very sound of cannon
. . . as fast as their feet could carry them.”78 The North Ministry eventually
turned, despite the warnings of its senior officer in America, General Thomas
Gage, to the one element of national power it could control and employ in short
order—the military.79 In retrospect, it could legitimately be argued, that Great
Britain’s strategic leaders lost the war for America before it ever began.80
The British experience with irregular warfare, particularly in the South,
constitutes a second and exceedingly relevant lesson for the contemporary
United States. The American Revolution differed significantly from the traditional dynastic wars of the eighteenth-century.81 Though there were compelling
elements of the latter that gave the conflict an appearance of conventional
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interstate warfare, in reality, a loose confederation of patriot militia and political leaders, cementing the loyalty and allegiance of their fellow countrymen
in countless towns and villages, not the application of regular military force,
proved decisive. An important, if generally underappreciated, phenomenon
clearly articulated by the late Walter Mills:
Repeatedly it was the militia which met the critical emergency or, in
less formal operations, kept control of the country, cut off foragers,
captured British agents, intimidated the war-weary and disaffected or
tarred and feathered the notorious Tories. While the regular armies
marched and fought more or less ineffectually, it was the militia which
presented the greatest single impediment to Britain’s only practicable
weapon, that of counter-revolution.82

Britain’s army, like that of the modern United States, was trained,
organized, and equipped to seek decisive battle with a like opponent, operating under the traditional political-military construct of the Clausewitzian
trinity.83 This paradigm, while applicable in conventional interstate conflict,
proved woefully inadequate for the challenges and nuance of intrastate warfare
waged against an extra-legal political entity.84 While British tactical acumen
proved effective militarily, it could never, in and of itself, secure the loyalty
or allegiance of the population. The creation of numerous provincial units like
the Queen’s Rangers, Tarleton’s Legion, et al. reinforces the idea that several
British tactical and operational commanders, over time, came to appreciate the
reality and the complexities of the type of war upon which they were engaged.85
The development of British strategy, however, struggled to catch up to the facts
on the ground.86 Ultimately, the British Army, not unlike the employment of US
forces in Vietnam, proved neither an adequate shield for the loyalist population
nor a terrible swift-sword capable of destroying a fledgling, but increasingly
capable, Continental Army. Thus, in waging a war it was not intellectually
prepared to fight, the British Army lost the opportunity to fight the war it knew
how to win.87
Finally, British strategic failure in America serves as a powerful reminder that the long-term interest of the state must not fall victim to
fear, honor, and an overinflated view of what is militarily possible or wise.88
Throughout the war the British, “made their plans to suit their understanding
of the rebellion and that understanding was shaped consistently by ignorance
and by wishful thinking.”89 America can ill afford to be provoked or deluded
into making a similar mistake in the twenty-first century. A great nation, to
remain so, must employ superior strategic thinking and foresight to avoid the
perils of desultory warfare or the necessity to exercise superior force in the
first place. The tragedy for the United States is not that it lost the Vietnam War
or now finds itself mired in expensive, protracted, and irregular conflicts like
Iraq and Afghanistan, but rather, in the process of usurping Great Britain as the
economic, political, and military leader of the free world, it seemingly forgot a
series of lessons it once taught.90
British strategic failure in America, not unlike the French in Algeria,
the United States in Vietnam, or the Soviets in Afghanistan, demonstrated the
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futility of limited conventional military force to solve what was essentially
a political problem and terminated, only belatedly, with a somber realization
that the country’s long-term interest demanded the preservation of her national
power, vice the short-term and perpetual expenditure of it, in pursuit of a political objective that was in no way commensurate with the costs. Unwilling to
destroy the colonies in order to save them, British military strategy became a
reluctant prisoner of deeply flawed strategic assumptions, a government that
failed to determine a realistic and militarily attainable political objective, and a
blatant inability to accurately determine the kind of war upon which the nation
was engaged until it was far too late.
Viewed in this light, the Southern Campaign represents not so much the
separate and distinct phase of the war it is so often portrayed to be, but rather,
it reflected the logical byproduct of years of political miscalculation and the
devolution of a military strategy that increasingly came to rely on a “pacification” strategy, predicated on the promise of loyalist support, to compensate for
a paucity of both forces and political will to continue a controversial, expensive,
and increasingly unpopular war.91 It also represented a belated, though certainly unstated, admission that blows alone, or more precisely, the chimera of
decisive battle, could not secure the loyalty and allegiance of an ambivalent or
hostile people, numerous, and armed. In the process, the British learned that
battlefield brilliance seldom rescues bad strategy; there are, in fact, limits to
what military force can achieve, and national leaders who base their plans and
policies primarily on hope and a stubborn belief in the sanctity of their own
concerted views, if wrong, can lead a nation to disaster. Contemporary practitioners of the profession of arms should neither hold the British in contempt
nor hypocritically criticize their strategic failure in America; rather we should
learn from it—ex preteritus nostrum posterus.92
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